

this war lasts. If we change now, it will be a confession that we have been wrong and that Europe has been right, and if we make this confession, we shall not only be powerless to assist the belligerent countries by a good example, but we shall, by imitation, encourage them in the course which has drawn them into this unprecedented conflict. If we are ever to change our policy, now of all times is not the time.

We must consider also our influence on Latin America. If we adopt this new policy and turn our energies from the arts of preparation for war, will not our neighboring republics be urged to follow our example? Can we afford to take the responsibility of retarding their progress by encouraging them to divert their money from needed improvements, to expenditures which are not only unnecessary, but a menace to the friendly relations which now exist between them? There is no excuse for the present outburst of war spirit—it is not only without excuse, but contains infinite possibilities for harm.

Second, there never has been a time in fifty years when we were in less danger than now. No nation has any thought of waging war against us and our preparedness is increasing relatively more rapidly than ever before. If the warring nations keep on killing each other as they are killing each other now, burning up property as they are burning it up now, and mortgaging the future as they are mortgaging it now, they will not have left enough able-bodied men, enough money or enough credit to threaten a nation like this. No, there is no excuse for the attempt which is now being made to lash the country into a fright over possible wars. Let us do what we can to stop the war in Europe; humanity, as well as our own security, demands it. But if we can not stop the war there—if the dogs of war must fight—we should at least keep hydrophobia out of this country while the war lasts.

And now let us consider the way out or the road to permanent peace. And before taking up the real way out let us for a moment look at some of the ways that do not lead out. Some talk of annihilation and argue that the war must go on until one side completely effaces the other. Annihilation is a big word and the annihilation of a nation a very difficult task. Long before they are in sight of annihilation they will be so sick of bloodshed that they will stop. There are already signs of sickness now. They have been striking in the coal mines on one side and in the gun factories on the other. On one side they have been protesting against threatened conscription and on the other against the doctrine of conquest. No, they will not carry the war to the point of annihilation, and if they did it would be a crime against civilization. If they do not know each other, we know them all, for their children have come among us and have helped to make this country what it is. We know that these belligerent nations have reached their present positions through struggles that have lasted for centuries and that each one has a priceless contribution to make to the future of the world. God might have made all the flowers of one color and with a single fragrance, but the world would not have been as attractive had He done so. And so God might have made all the nations with one history and a single language, but I believe that the world is better for their rivalries and their competitions; they together constitute one resplendent political bouquet.

Some think that if the war does not go on until annihilation takes place it must at least go on until one side is so completely triumphant that it can dictate the terms of peace, compel the acceptance of those terms, and thereafter maintain the peace of Europe by the sword. But when we consider the immense masses of men on either side this thought is almost as idle as the thought of annihilation, and it will not brighten the future if as result of this war one nation or group of nations emerges from the conflict master on land or sea.

If there is one lesson which history teaches more clearly than any other it is that nations which aspire to mere physical supremacy have no hope of immortality; the fact that they put their faith in force is proof that they have in them the seeds of death. The pathway of human progress is lined with the wrecks of empires which, when at the zenith of their power, thought themselves invincible.

What the world needs is not a despot to fix the terms upon which the rest shall live; its great need is that these nations shall be brought together in a spirit of friendship and fellowship, that they may co-operate in work-

ing out the destiny of Europe. If this nation has any influence, that influence must be exerted to bring the warring nations together and not to encourage them in the false hope that a permanent peace can be built on force or fear.

All of the rulers of the nations at war tell us that they did not want the war and did not cause it, but none of them tell us how it can be brought to an end. Have not these neutral nations, all of whom bear burdens though they are not to blame, a right to know what it is that, being done, peace may be restored? For what are the nations fighting—not in general terms but specifically? Is it territory that they want, then how much and where is it located? Is it blood that they demand, then how much more blood must be shed to avenge the blood already shed? If they will not answer the neutral nations, will they not make answer to their own people? The day will come when this accumulated sorrow will overflow—when this pent-up anguish will find a voice—and then, if not before, the rulers must answer that stern question which shakes thrones and fixes the farthest limits of arbitrary power: "Why do we die?"

Europe has had machinery for war, but not for peace. The nations of Europe could go to war in a minute, but they were not sufficiently supplied with machinery for the adjustment of difficulties that defied diplomatic settlement. And we can not be harsh in our criticism because, until recently, this nation was almost as poorly supplied as the European nations with the machinery for the preservation of peace. Until within three years our best treaties were those known as the "Arbitration Treaties" and they had two serious defects. First, they only ran five years and then died. And when one of these treaties died it had to be renewed by the same formalities required for its negotiation. It had to be ratified by two-thirds of the senate, which meant that though the President might desire to continue it and though a majority of the senate might desire to continue it, the extension of its life could be prevented if a minority of the senate, more than one-third, objected. But a still more serious defect was found in the fact that these treaties did not cover all questions—they excepted questions of honor, questions of independence, vital interests and interests of third parties, the very questions out of which wars are apt to grow. When a man is angry every question is a question of honor, every interest a vital interest. Man angry is a very different animal from man calm; when a man is angry he swaggers about and talks about what he can do, and he generally overestimates it. When he is calm he thinks about what he ought to do and listens to the voice of conscience.

We now have thirty treaties with nations representing three-fourths of the world and these treaties cure the defects of which I have spoken. In the first place, instead of dying at the end of five years they never die. They run on and on and on until twelve months after one side or the other has asked that they be discontinued. I believe that neither side will ever ask that these treaties be discontinued. I have such faith in these treaties that I believe that a thousand years from now the name of Woodrow Wilson and my name will be linked together in the capitals of the world and that these treaties will preserve the peace of our nation by furnishing machinery by which peace can be preserved with honor.

But what is more important than length of life, these treaties contain no exceptions; they cover all disputes of every kind and character. Each one of these thirty treaties provides that every dispute that defies diplomatic settlement, if not by some other treaty submitted for final settlement, must be submitted to an international commission for investigation and report. Each one of these thirty treaties also provides that the period of investigation may last a year, and each one of these treaties further provides that during the period of investigation neither side shall declare war or begin hostilities. Here are three provisions, new to treaty-making, which reduce war between us and the contracting parties to a remote possibility.

We do not contend that war is made impossible—I only wish it were possible to make war impossible. But in order to secure the investigation of all questions it was necessary to reserve to each nation the right of independent action at the conclusion of the investigation. If any one believes that war may sometimes be necessary, let him find consolation in the fact

that every one of these treaties specifically reserves the right of our nation to go to war. If any desire war, all they have to do is to stir the people up to fever heat and keep them there for a year; then if no other way out is found, the nation is at liberty to fight its way out. And I so much believe in the right of the people to have what they want that I admit the right of the people to go to war if they really want it. But I feel as a North Carolina congressman expressed himself, that if we are to have war it would be better for the people to vote it upon themselves than to have others vote it on them. If there is any question upon which there should be a referendum vote, it is the question of peace or war which may mean life or death to so many people. And if we have a referendum vote on war, it will only be fair that the women shall vote as well as the men, for women bear the larger portion of the burden in time of war. I believe that the women should vote on all questions, but if they vote on only one, it ought to be at an election which decides the issue between peace and war.

And I agree with the North Carolina congressman in another matter. He suggests that it would insure deliberation on the part of the voters if the vote was taken with the understanding that those who voted for war would enlist first; and that those who voted against war would constitute a great reserve army which would not be called into service until after all those who voted for war had had a chance to show what they could do. I like the idea and I venture to add another suggestion. I am a journalist, among other things; whenever any one asks me what I am, my answer is, a journalist. I am proud of the profession, though not of all the members of it. If we have war, I shall insist in the name of the journalists of the country that the first battle line shall be made up of jingo editors that they may have the glory of dying before any one else is hurt.

These thirty treaties will, in my judgment, go far toward preserving peace and I believe that the principle ought to be applied to all nations. If the plan is good enough to offer to all nations—and the offer has never been withdrawn; if the plan is good enough to be entered into with nations representing one billion three hundred millions of people; if the plan is good enough to be endorsed in principle by Germany, Austria and Belgium, countries with which treaties of this kind have not yet been negotiated—it is good enough to be used with any country before we go to war with that country.

But I will go a step further; even if we use the treaty plan and it fails to secure a settlement—or if we fail to use it and reach a point where we must decide, either to go into this war or to postpone final settlement of the dispute until this war is over—if we must choose between these two alternatives, I believe it would be the part of wisdom to postpone final settlement until the war is over. First, because postponement would make war unnecessary, and that would be a sufficient reason for postponing it. We would have no difficulty in settling any dispute we now have or which may arise during the war but for the fear of the effect of the settlement upon the war itself.

But even if a postponement did not prevent war, it would be better to have our war after this war is over than during this war, because it would then be our own war with the country with which we had our dispute and we could not only go into the war at pleasure, but come out at will. But this war is not our war—it is everybody's war—and if we go into it, we can not come out without consulting others, and others would determine also what we would fight for while we were in—and God forbid that we shall ever tie ourselves to the quarrels, rivalries and ambitions of the nations of Europe.

And now bear with me for a moment while I present three reasons why it is imperatively necessary that we shall not enter this war. I shall not present these reasons in the order of their importance, rather in inverse order. First, no one can tell what it would cost us in dollars to enter this war. It is not like any other war and therefore estimates based upon the past would be of little value. Let those who glibly talk of war give us a guess as to what it would cost to take part in this war and then give a guaranty that their guess is high enough. Many predictions have been made in regard to this war, but so far none have been verified. Would it cost one billion? One of the jingo papers insisted a few weeks ago that congress should be called together immediately to vote a credit of one billion dollars in anticipation of a possible war. It would be more likely to cost us five bil-